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not be in fear of their safety or suspect that evidence of a crime
will be discovered within the container or compartment to justify
a warrantless search. 185
Both the New York State and Federal Constitution recognize
exigent circumstances as justifying warrantless searches incident
to arrest. However, the State Constitution dictates that the

reasonableness of each search and/or seizure be determined
according to the particular facts and circumstances of each case,
and therefore, is not as broad as the Federal Constitution. 18 6
While the state protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures to a greater degree by conducting a case by case
analysis, the federal rule is perhaps more conducive to uniformity
and efficiency since police are given -bright line" rules for

distinguishing between permissible and impermissible searches
187
and seizures.

THIRD DEPARTMENT
People v. Pena188
(decided November 3, 1994)
Defendant claimed that his state 189 and federal 190 constitutional

right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was
185. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d at 458, 452 N.E.2d at 1226, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
186. Id. (citing People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 222-23, 352 N.E.2d
562, 571, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 384 (1976)).

187. Id. at 457, 452 N.E.2d at 1226, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 898 (citing Illinois v.
Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200.
213-14 (1979); United States v. Robinson. 414 U.S. 218. 235 (1973)).
188. 618 N.Y.S.2d 149 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1994).
189. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Article I, section 12 provides in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons. houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. ..." Id.
190. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.... ." Id.
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violated when he was illegally detained and interrogated based on
an involuntary consent to search his car. 19 1 The Appellate
Division, Third Department, first ruled that the police officer's
conduct was proper in initially stopping the defendant's car,
directing the defendant to exit his automobile and running a radio
check of the defendant's car. 192 Second, the court held that the
"plain view" doctrine was applicable in this situation, where the
officer shone a flashlight inside defendant's car and observed
marijuana. 193 Finally, the court ruled that the defendant had
orally consented to the search. 194 Thus, the court ultimately
found that the defendant's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures was not violated. 195
On August 13, 1991, the defendant-driver was pulled over in
an automobile by State Troopers Lane and Ernst for driving with
a missing license plate light. 196 Lane approached the defendant
and asked for his license and registration for the car, whereby the
defendant produced his license but did not produce a
registration. 197 The defendant told Lane that he did not know
who owned the car nor where the registration was located. 198
Lane asked the defendant to exit the car and proceed to the back
of the vehicle. 199 Lane returned to the front of the vehicle and
spoke with codefendant Hector Pena, who was seated in the back
of the car. 200 It was during this time that Lane had shone his
flashlight towards the rear floor and observed marijuana. 20 1 Lane
retrieved the marijuana and then asked the defendant-driver, if
there was any more in the car to which defendant-driver replied,
"No. . . [g]o ahead and look if you want.' 202 Codefendant
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Pena. 618 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
Id.
Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 150.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Pena also agreed to a search of the car when he responded that
there was no other contraband in the car.203 Both defendants
signed written consent-to-search forms, provided by another State
trooper. 20 4 The search uncovered a revolver, protruding from the
dashboard, and cocaine obtained from the trunk. 205
Consequently, the defendant was charged and convicted of
several criminal offenses. 206 In this appeal, the defendant
contended that his motion to suppress should have been granted
because the prosecution failed to prove that the consent was
voluntary and thus resulted in an illegal detention and
interrogation. 207
In reaching its conclusion that the search and seizure of the
vehicle was lawful, the appellate division first ruled that the
officer's action leading up to the search was proper. 208 The Pena
court initially noted that the police conduct of detaining the
defendants and requiring the defendant-driver to exit the car was
valid based on the fact that the defendant could not produce his
registration. 209 The court relied on reasoning in New York v.
Class,2 10 where the Supreme Court held that "officers may,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, exercise their discretion
to require a driver who commits a traffic violation to exit the
vehicle even though they lack any particularized reason for
believing the driver possesses a weapon." 2 11 Because the
defendant was the driver, the court noted that he had an
203. Id. at 150.
204. Id. at 150-51.

205. Id. at 151.
206. Id. The defendant was charged with "criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the
third degree, unlawful possession of marijuana and an equipment violation."
Id.

207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. 475 U.S. 106, 115 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of police search

and seizure of weapon, where officer reached into passenger compartment of
vehicle to remove objects obstructing the Vehicle Identification Number and
observed gun protruding from under car seat).
211. Id.
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obligation to produce the registration of the vehicle and give the
officers information concerning the identity of the vehicle and
owner. 2 12 The court, in Pena, further reasoned that by not
producing the registration, nor informing the officer as to who
owned the vehicle, the officers were permitted to detain the
vehicle and its occupants while conducting the investigation. 213
The Pena court further ruled that the radio check conducted by
the officers was not unreasonably delayed. 2 14 "Weighing the

degree of intrusion against the precipitating and attending
circumstances," the court ruled that the delay for the radio check
was reasonable. 2 15 In support of this conclusion, the court cited
People v. Durgey,2 16 which stands for the proposition that police
conduct in detaining a vehicle is measured by the "reasonableness
standard, which requires a weighing of the degree of intrusion

against the precipitating and attending

circumstances." '2 17

Therefore, the court in Pena found that the conduct of the police
was proper in stopping and detaining the vehicle and its
occupants. 2 18
212. Pena, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 151. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 401(4)
(McKinney 1986). Section 401(4) provides in pertinent part: "Any... police
officer may request that the operator of any motor vehicle produce for
inspection the certificate of registration for such vehicle and such operator
shall furnish ...

any information necessary for the identification of such

vehicle and its owner, and all information required concerning his license to
operate .

. . ."

Id.

213. Pena, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 151. See People v. Alexander, 189 A.D.2d
189, 194-95, 595 N.Y.S.2d 279, 283 (4th Dep't 1993) (holding that following
a traffic stop, police officers were authorized to detain car and driver to "run a
routine license and registration check" after driver had failed to produce a
license or registration).
214. Pena, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
215. Id.
216. 186 A.D.2d 899, 589 N.Y.S.2d 631 (3d Dep't 1992). In Durgey, the
driver was stopped for speeding and consented to a search of his car. Id. at
900, 589 N.Y.S.2d at 633. The police officers discovered a bag of money
which was subsequently used as evidence in burglary and criminal possession
charges against the defendants. Id.
217. Id. (citing People v. Sora, 176 A.D.2d 1172. 1173, 575 N.Y.S.2d
970, 972 (3d Dep't 1991)).
218. Pena, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
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The Pena court next analyzed the police search under the plain
view doctrine. 2 19 The court relied on People v. Sanders,220
where the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that
subsequent to the police officer observing heroin "in plain view
on the front seat of the defendant's vehicle, he had the right to
conduct a thorough search of the vehicle for additional
contraband and the fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of the
crime in question." 22 1 The Pena court, applying the decision in
Sanders, determined that the "plain view" doctrine could be
applied to the defendant once Lane observed the marijuana in the
vehicle. 222
Furthermore, defendant argued that the police officer's conduct
of shining a flashlight into the car was an illegal search. 223 In
rejecting the defendant's argument, the court in Pena held that
Lane was initially authorized to "shine his flashlight into [the
vehicle] to observe the car's darkened interior." 2 24 The court,
relying on the decision in People v. Manganaro,225 held that
Lane's conduct of flashing a light into the defendant's automobile
did not constitute a search. 22 6
Finally, the Pena court addressed the issue of whether the
defendant had voluntarily consented to the search. 227 The court,
utilizing the totality of the circumstances test espoused in People
v. Sora,228 held that the defendant orally consented to the search
219. Id. at 152.
220. 143 A.D.2d 1063, 533 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1988).

221. Id. at 1063, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 640-41.
222. Pena, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 151 (citing People v. Cruz, 34 N.Y.2d 362, 370, 314 N.E.2d
39, 44, 357 N.Y.S.2d 709, 715 (1975)).
225. 176 A.D.2d 354, 574 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1991). In Manganaro,

the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the officer's conduct of
looking through the window of a parked car was not a search. Id. at 355, 574
N.Y.S.2d at 588.
226. Pena, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52.
227. Id. at 152.

228. 176 A.D.2d 1172, 1174, 575 N.Y.S.2d 970, 972 (3d Dep't 1991)
("[Tihe voluntariness of defendant's consent is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of the circumstances... Iblecause 'voluntariness
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because he was shown to have understood the English language
at the time of the consent and because the consent itself was
229
found to have been voluntary.
This decision is consistent with federal case law. In Class, the
Supreme Court held that a search of a car is constitutional after
being stopped for a traffic violation. 230 In cases where the safety
of the officer is compromised, a warrantless search for weapons
may be justified "based only on a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. "231 The Supreme Court noted that because the
governmental "intrusion was minimal.., probable cause
stemmed from directly observing (defendant] commit a violation
of the law." 232 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized the concept that "[ilt is

. .

. beyond dispute that [a

police officer's] action in shining his flashlight to illuminate the
interior of [defendant's] car trenched upon no right secured to the
latter by the Fourth Amendment." 2 33 Finally, the Supreme Court
has noted that after an officer legally stops a person in a vehicle
and sees contraband in "plain view," the officer is permitted to
seize the contraband. 234

is incompatible with official coercion, actual or implicit, overt or subtle.'"
(quoting People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 128, 347 N.E.2d 575, 580, 383
N.Y.S.2d 215, 219 (1976))).
229. Pena, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
230. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1986).
231. Id. at 117.
232. Id. at 117-18.

233. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983). See United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) ("[T]he officers' use of the beam of a
flashlight, directed through the essentially open front of respondent's barn, did
not transform their observations into an unreasonable search within the
meaning of [the] Fourth Amendment.").
234. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 472 (1971) (holding

that a warrantless search of defendant's car was unconstitutional since the
police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (discussing elements of plain view doctrine,
including limitations that initial intrusion is independently justified and that the
discovery of plain view evidence is inadvertent).
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